A Game-Theoretic Approach to Covert Communications by Leong, Alex S. et al.
A Game-Theoretic Approach to Covert
Communications
Alex S. Leong, Daniel E. Quevedo, and Subhrakanti Dey
Abstract—This paper considers a game-theoretic formulation
of the covert communications problem with finite blocklength,
where the transmitter (Alice) can randomly vary her transmit
power in different blocks, while the warden (Willie) can randomly
vary his detection threshold in different blocks. In this two
player game, the payoff for Alice is a combination of the coding
rate to the receiver (Bob) and the detection error probability
at Willie, while the payoff for Willie is the negative of his
detection error probability. Nash equilibrium solutions to the
game are obtained, and shown to be efficiently computable using
linear programming. For less covert requirements, our game-
theoretic approach can achieve significantly higher coding rates
than uniformly distributed transmit powers. We then consider
the situation with an additional jammer, where Alice and the
jammer can both vary their powers. We pose a two player
game where Alice and the jammer jointly comprise one player,
with Willie the other player. The use of a jammer is shown in
numerical simulations to lead to further significant performance
improvements.
I. INTRODUCTION
In covert communications, a transmitter (Alice) transmits
to a receiver (Bob) in the presence of a warden (Willie).
The aim is for the transmission to be such that the very
presence of a transmission or non-transmission is difficult
for Willie to distinguish between [1], [2]. Applications of
covert communication include the prevention of knowledge
of transmission for use as metadata or to maintain privacy,
communication in the presence of authoritarian governments,
and military communications where detection of transmissions
can reveal one’s location to enemies [3].
In [1] it was shown that Alice can transmit O(
√
N) bits
in N channel uses covertly and reliably to Bob as N → ∞.
Covertness is defined in the sense that
PFA + PM ≥ 1−  for any  > 0, (1)
with PFA denoting the probability of false alarm and PM
the probability of missed detection. Further refinements of
this result include [4]–[6]. Later, it was shown that in certain
situations, it is possible to transmit O(N) bits in N channel
uses as N → ∞, such as when there is uncertainty in the
receiver noise variance [7], or when there is an uninformed
jammer [3].
The above results are asymptotic in that the results apply
for N → ∞. The case of finite N has been considered in
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[8], where expressions for PFA and PM were derived, and
the use of uniformly distributed transmission powers was also
proposed as a way to improve performance over the use of
constant powers. The current paper also considers the case of
finite N . Instead of uniformly distributed transmission powers,
we instead wish to find the “optimal” distribution of transmit
powers. Note that if Alice knows the detection threshold that
Willie uses, then such an optimal distribution can be found.
On the other hand, Willie himself could also try to randomly
vary his detection threshold to confuse Alice and potentially
improve his detection performance. Due to the competing
objectives for Alice and Willie, in this paper we will use
game theory to model such interactions. We will formulate
the situation as a two player nonzero sum/zero sum game,
and show that Nash equilibrium solutions can be computed
efficiently using linear programming.
We then consider the case where there is also a jammer
[3], where we now allow both the transmission and jamming
powers to randomly vary. Here we formulate a two player
game where Alice and the jammer jointly form one player,
while Willie is the other player. We similarly show that
Nash equilibria can be computed using linear programming.
It should be noted that a recent work [9] has considered a
power-threshold game in a non-randomized setting without
a jammer, where Alice and Willie choose their power and
threshold respectively, in a deterministic fashion. Standard
Nash equilibrium was derived in this case along with a
Bayesian game formulation for the case where Willie’s noise
power is not known to Alice exactly, but only in distribution.
The paper is organized as follows. The system model is
presented in Section II. The game-theoretic formulation is
presented in Section III. Section IV extends the results to
the case with an additional jammer. Numerical studies and
comparisons are given in Section V.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
A diagram of the system model is shown in Fig. 1. Let xk
be the signal that is to be transmitted. The warden (Willie)
wishes to decide between two hypotheses:
H0 : yw,k = nw,k, k = 1, . . . , N
H1 : yw,k = xk + nw,k, k = 1, . . . , N
based on collecting N observations, where yw,k is the received
signal by Willie at time k, and nw,k ∼ CN (0, σ2w) is
complex Gaussian channel noise. Hypothesis H0 means that
the transmitter (Alice) did not transmit to the receiver (Bob),
while hypothesis H1 means that Alice transmitted. We assume
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Fig. 1. System model - Transmitter varying transmit power
that the coding blocklength is equal to N . The received signals
at Bob under the different hypotheses are:
H0 : yb,k = nb,k, k = 1, . . . , N
H1 : yb,k = xk + nb,k, k = 1, . . . , N
where nb,k ∼ CN (0, σ2b ).
We assume Gaussian signalling such that xk ∼ CN (0, P ).
The transmit power P varies between different blocks, but
stays constant within each block of N time slots. We assume
that Bob knows the (random) values of P used in each block
via some shared secret between Alice and Bob, but that Willie
only knows the distribution of P .1
Willie wants to detect transmissions of Alice. Optimal de-
tection at Willie usually takes on the form of a likelihood ratio
test [10], [11]. Given H0, we have yw,k ∼ CN (0, σ2w), and
given H1, we have yw,k ∼ CN (0, P + σ2w) for k = 1, . . . , N .
Then the likelihood ratio test can be easily shown to be
equivalent to an energy detector which decides H1 if
T , 1
N
N∑
k=1
|yw,k|2 (2)
exceeds a threshold t, and decides H0 otherwise [10].
In covert communications, Alice wants to transmit to Bob
while ensuring that the probability of being detected at Willie
is sufficiently low [2]. One strategy for Alice to improve her
performance (e.g. in terms of the transmission rate to Bob, or
the detection probability at Willie) is by randomizing between
a few different transmission powers, with the aim of confus-
ing Willie. In [8] the case of uniformly distributed P was
considered and shown to outperform the use of constant P .
For the current paper we consider the problem of optimizing
the distribution for P . Suppose that P > 0 can take on a finite
number of values
P1, P2, . . . , PI ,
and denote
piPi , P(P = Pi), i = 1, . . . , I.
Now if Willie uses a fixed detection threshold t, then
Alice can optimize her transmission power distribution for that
1In game theoretic terminology this is equivalent to saying that Willie
knows the mixed strategy that Alice will play.
particular threshold.2 However, if Willie decides to random-
ize his detection threshold, he in turn could confuse Alice
and possibly increase his detection performance. Due to the
competing objectives of Alice and Willie, in this paper we will
adopt a game-theoretic formulation of the situation, which will
be presented in Section III. We thus assume that t can take on
values
t1, t2, . . . , tM
with
pitm , P(t = tm), m = 1, . . . ,M.
The case where t can take on a continuum of values can be
approximated by discretization of the real interval using a large
number of discretization points.
The statistic T defined in (2) is equivalent to a scaled
chi-squared distributed random variable with 2N degrees of
freedom under both hypotheses, with scaling σ
2
w
2N under H0,
and scaling P+σ
2
w
2N under H1 and transmit power P . The
likelihood functions of T under H0 and H1 are then
f(T |H0) = T
N−1
Γ(N)
(
N
σ2w
)N
exp
(
−NT
σ2w
)
f(T |H1) = T
N−1
Γ(N)
I∑
i=1
(
N
Pi + σ2w
)N
exp
(
− NT
Pi + σ2w
)
piPi
where Γ(.) is the gamma function. Let PFA =
P(decide H1|H0) and PM = P(decide H0|H1) denote
the probability of false alarm and probability of missed
detection respectively. We will say that the communication
scheme is covert [8] if3
PFA + PM ≥ 1−  for some  > 0.
From the relation∫
TN−1 exp
(
−NT
x
)
dT = −
(
N
x
)−N
Γ
(
N,
NT
x
)
(3)
where
Γ(s, x) =
∫ ∞
x
ts−1e−tdt
is the incomplete gamma function, one can easily show that
for given distributions of transmit powers piP , (piP1 , . . . , piPI )
and detection thresholds pit , (pit1, . . . , pitM ), the probabilities
of false alarm and missed detection are
PFA(piP , pit) = P(T > t|piP , pit,H0) =
M∑
m=1
Γ(N, Ntmσ2w
)
Γ(N)
pitm
PM (piP , pit) = P(T < t|piP , pit,H1)
=
M∑
m=1
I∑
i=1
[
1−
Γ(N, NtmPi+σ2w
)
Γ(N)
]
piPi pi
t
m.
Note that the expression for PFA(piP , pit) does not actually
depend on piP , but for notational consistency with Section IV
we will use PFA(piP , pit) rather than PFA(pit).
2For instance, one can pose a problem of maximizing the transmission rate
to Bob while constraining the detection error probability for Willie.
3As we are considering finite blocklengths, we do not consider arbitrarily
small  in the sense of (1).
III. GAME-THEORETIC FORMULATION
For finite blocklengths, the channel coding rate from Alice
to Bob in bits per channel use is approximated by (see [12],
[13])
R ≈ log2(1 + SNRb)−
√
1
N
(
1− 1
(SNRb + 1)2
)
Q−1(δ)
ln(2)
(4)
where SNRb is the signal-to-noise ratio at Bob, Q−1(.) is the
inverse Q-function, and δ is the decoding error probability.
For future reference, define the function R(.) by
R(x) , log2(1 + x)−
√
1
N
(
1− 1
(x+ 1)2
)
Q−1(δ)
ln(2)
(5)
In this section we consider posing the situation in Section
II as a two player game between Alice and Willie, where we
wish to find Nash equilibrium solutions to the game. It is well
known that for finite games, mixed strategy Nash equilibria
always exist. Here the mixed strategies for Alice and Willie
are piP and pit respectively.
For transmit power P , the signal-to-noise ratio at Bob is
SNRb = Pσ2b
. Alice wants to maximize the payoff
I∑
i=1
R
(
Pi
σ2b
)
piPi + β(PFA(piP , pit) + PM (piP , pit)) (6)
where R(.) is defined by (5) and the parameter β > 0
controls the tradeoff between the (approximate) expected
channel coding rate at Bob and covertness at Willie. Smaller
values of β will place more emphasis on achieving a large
coding rate, while larger values of β will have more em-
phasis on achieving higher detection error probabilities (i.e.
be more covert). Willie on the other hand wants to minimize
PFA(piP , pit) + PM (piP , pit), so he has payoff
− (PFA(piP , pit) + PM (piP , pit)). (7)
This game with payoffs (6) and (7) for Alice and Bob respec-
tively is a non-zero-sum game. Nash equilibria to general non-
zero-sum games can be found numerically using algorithms
such as the Lemke-Howson algorithm [14], [15].
An alternative zero-sum game can also be posed, where
Alice has payoff (6) and Willie has payoff
−
I∑
i=1
R
(
Pi
σ2b
)
piPi − β(PFA(piP , pit) + PM (piP , pit)). (8)
The payoff for Willie can be motivated by saying that in
addition to wanting to minimize PFA(piP , pit) + PM (piP , pit),
Willie also prefers Alice to achieve a lower rate. However, it
turns out that the Nash equilibria for both the non-zero-sum
and zero-sum games are the same.
Theorem 1. The non-zero-sum game with payoffs (6) and (7),
and the zero-sum game with payoffs (6) and (8), have the same
Nash equilibria.
Proof. Let (piP∗, pit∗) be a Nash equilibrium to the non-zero-
sum game with payoffs (6) and (7). For fixed pit∗, as the payoff
(6) for Alice is the same in both games, there is no incentive
for Alice to deviate from piP∗ in the zero-sum game. While
for fixed piP∗, as −∑Ii=1R(Piσ2b )piPi does not depend on pit,
optimizing (8) over pit is equivalent to optimizing (7), and
thus there is no incentive for Willie to deviate from pit∗ in the
zero-sum game. Hence (piP∗, pit∗) is also a Nash equilibrium
to the zero-sum game with payoffs (6) and (8).
A similar argument can be used to show that Nash equilibria
to the zero-sum game are also Nash equilibria to the non-zero-
sum game.
One of the advantages of zero-sum games is that they can
be solved efficiently using linear programming [15] (note that
the Lemke-Howson algorithm itself is similar to the simplex
algorithm). A Nash equilibrium mixed strategy for Alice can
be found by solving the linear program:
max
{piPi },U
U
s.t.
I∑
i=1
[
R
(
Pi
σ2b
)
+ β
(Γ(N, Ntmσ2w )
Γ(N)
+ 1−
Γ(N, NtmPi+σ2w
)
Γ(N)
)]
piPi ≥ U,
m = 1, . . . ,M,
I∑
i=1
piPi = 1, 0 ≤ piPi ≤ 1, (9)
while a Nash equilibrium mixed strategy for Willie can be
found by solving the linear program:
min
{pitm},U
U
s.t.
M∑
m=1
[
R
(
Pi
σ2b
)
+ β
(Γ(N, Ntmσ2w )
Γ(N)
+ 1−
Γ(N, NtmPi+σ2w
)
Γ(N)
)]
pitm ≤ U,
i = 1, . . . , I,
M∑
m=1
pitm = 1, 0 ≤ pitm ≤ 1. (10)
Another advantage of zero-sum games is that their Nash
equilibria have nice “uniqueness” properties. We first give the
following definition (see also [16, p.233]):
Definition 1. Two Nash equilibria (piP , pit) and (piP
′
, pit
′
)
are:
(i) interchangeable if (piP , pit
′
) and (piP
′
, pit) are also Nash
equilibria
(ii) equivalent if the payoffs from using the mixed strategy
(piP , pit) are the same as the payoffs from using the mixed
strategy (piP
′
, pit
′
).
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Bob
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Fig. 2. System model - Presence of a jammer
The following is a standard result in game theory, see e.g.
[16, p.232] for a proof.
Theorem 2. All Nash equilibria in zero-sum games are
interchangeable and equivalent.
We have shown in Theorem 1 that our original game with
payoffs (6) and (7) has the same Nash equilibria as the zero-
sum game with payoffs (6) and (8). A Nash equilibrium
to this zero-sum game can be found by solving the linear
programs (9)-(10). By Theorem 2, this Nash equilibrium has
performance as good any other Nash equilibria of the game.
Hence there is no loss of performance in using the mixed
strategies obtained by solving the linear programs (9)-(10).
IV. PRESENCE OF A COOPERATIVE JAMMER
In this section we extend our setup to the situation where
there is also a jammer [3], which generates a jamming signal
to enhance covertness. It is known [3] that by using a jammer
with jamming powers unknown to Willie, the transmit powers
of Alice do not need to go to zero (as the blocklength
increases) in order to remain covert in the sense of [1]. In
this paper, we will consider the scenario where Alice and the
jammer cooperate by optimizing of the joint distribution of
transmit and jamming powers.
A. System Model
A diagram of the system model for this setup is shown
in Fig. 2. Let xk again denote the signal which is to be
transmitted. Willie now wishes to decide between the two
hypotheses:
H0 : yw,k = nw,k + jk, k = 1, . . . , N
H1 : yw,k = xk + nw,k + jk, k = 1, . . . , N
where jk ∼ CN (0, J) is the random jamming signal. The
jamming signal power J ≥ 0 varies randomly between
different blocks, but stays constant within each block of N
time slots. As before, we assume Gaussian signalling such that
xk ∼ CN (0, P ), with P varying randomly between blocks.
The received signals at Bob under the two hypotheses are:
H0 : yb,k = nb,k + αjk, k = 1, . . . , N
H1 : yb,k = xk + nb,k + αjk, k = 1, . . . , N
where α > 0 can be used to model different distances between
the jammer and Bob, and between the jammer and Willie. We
assume a cooperative jammer such that the transmit powers
P and jamming powers J used in each block are known to
Bob but unknown to Willie. The actual values of the random
jamming signal jk are unknown to either Bob or Willie.
We suppose that P > 0 can take on values
P1, P2, . . . , PI ,
while J ≥ 0 can take on values
J1, J2, . . . , JL.
The joint probabilities of transmit and jamming powers are
denoted by
piP,Ji,l , P(P = Pi, J = Jl), i = 1, . . . , I, l = 1, . . . , L.
The detection thresholds t can take on values
t1, . . . , tM
with
pitm , P(t = tm), m = 1, . . . ,M.
The likelihood functions of T = 1N
∑N
k=1 |yw,k|2 under H0
and H1 are now
f(T |H0) = T
N−1
Γ(N)
I∑
i=1
L∑
l=1
(
N
σ2w + Jl
)N
exp
(
− NT
σ2w + Jl
)
piP,Ji,l
f(T |H1) = T
N−1
Γ(N)
I∑
i=1
L∑
l=1
(
N
Pi + σ2w + Jl
)N
× exp
(
− NT
Pi + σ2w + Jl
)
piP,Ji,l .
Using again the relation (3), one can now show that for
given piP,J , {piP,Ji,l : i = 1, . . . , I, l = 1, . . . , L} and pit,
PFA(piP,J , pit) = P(T > t|piP,J , pit,H0)
=
M∑
m=1
I∑
i=1
L∑
l=1
Γ(N, Ntmσ2w+Jl
)
Γ(N)
piP,Ji,l pi
t
m
PM (piP,J , pit) = P(T < t|piP,J , pit,H1)
=
M∑
m=1
I∑
i=1
L∑
l=1
[
1−
Γ(N, NtmPi+σ2w+Jl
)
Γ(N)
]
piP,Ji,l pi
t
m.
B. Game-Theoretic Formulation
Given transmit power P and jamming power J , the signal-
to-noise ratio at Bob is now SNRb = Pσ2b+α2J
. We will formu-
late a two player game where the players are 1) Alice-jammer
(Alice and the jammer jointly regarded as a single player),
and 2) Willie, with mixed strategies piP,J and pit respectively.
Alice-jammer wants to jointly maximize the payoff
I∑
i=1
L∑
l=1
R
(
Pi
σ2b + α
2Jl
)
piP,Ji,l
+ β′(PFA(piP,J , pit) + PM (piP,J , pit)),
(11)
where R(.) is defined in (5) and β′ > 0 controls the tradeoff
between the coding rate at Bob and covertness at Willie.
Willie on the other hand wants to minimize PFA(piP,J , pit) +
PM (piP,J , pit), so he has payoff
− (PFA(piP,J , pit) + PM (piP,J , pit)). (12)
An alternative zero-sum game can be posed, where Alice-
jammer has payoff (11) and Willie has a payoff which is the
negative of (11).
Theorem 3. The non-zero-sum game with payoffs (11) and
(12), and the zero-sum game with payoffs (11) and the negative
of (11), have the same Nash equilibria.
Proof. Similar to the proof of Theorem 1.
A Nash equilibrium mixed strategy for Alice-jammer can
be found by solving the linear program:
max
{piP,Ji,l },U
U
s.t.
I∑
i=1
L∑
l=1
[
R
(
Pi
σ2b + α
2Jl
)
+ β′
(Γ(N, Ntmσ2w+Jl )
Γ(N)
+ 1−
Γ(N, NtmPi+σ2w+Jl
)
Γ(N)
)]
piP,Ji,l ≥ U,
m = 1, . . . ,M,
I∑
i=1
L∑
l=1
piP,Ji,l = 1, 0 ≤ piP,Ji,l ≤ 1, (13)
while a Nash equilibrium mixed strategy for Willie can be
found by solving the linear program:
min
{pitm},U
U
s.t.
M∑
m=1
[
R
(
Pi
σ2b + α
2Jl
)
+ β
(Γ(N, Ntmσ2w+Jl )
Γ(N)
+ 1−
Γ(N, NtmPi+σ2w+Jl
)
Γ(N)
)]
pitm ≤ U,
i = 1, . . . , I, l = 1, . . . , L,
M∑
m=1
pitm = 1, 0 ≤ pitm ≤ 1. (14)
Similar uniqueness properties of the Nash equilibria as
discussed at the end of Section III will also hold here.
Remark 1. The linear program (13) is not quite in standard
form, as the joint distribution piP,J is more conveniently viewed
as a matrix than a vector. It can however be put into standard
form by vectorizing piP,J . For instance, let an index y range
from 1 to I × L, and consider the mappings
i(y) ,
{
I, if y mod I = 0
y mod I, otherwise
l(y) ,
⌈y
I
⌉
, (15)
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Fig. 3. Transmit power distribution
where d.e is the ceiling operator. Then the linear program (13)
can be rewritten as:
max
{piy},U
U
s.t.
IL∑
y=1
[
R
(
Pi
σ2b + α
2Jl(y)
)
+ β′
(Γ(N, Ntmσ2w+Jl(y) )
Γ(N)
+ 1−
Γ(N, NtmPi(y)+σ2w+Jl(y)
)
Γ(N)
)]
piy ≥ U,
m = 1, . . . ,M,
IL∑
y=1
piy = 1, 0 ≤ piy ≤ 1,
where i(y) and l(y) are replaced by the mappings (15).
V. NUMERICAL STUDIES
A. Plots of probability distributions
We first show some plots of the Nash equilibrium mixed
strategies / probability distributions. For the case with no
jammer (Section III), we use the following parameters: σ2b =
0 dB, σ2w = 0 dB, δ = 0.1, N = 200, β = 1.6. The transmit
powers range from 0.01 mW to 1 mW in steps of 0.01 mW,
and the detection thresholds are discretized from 0 to 3 in
steps of 0.01. When solving the linear programs (9)-(10),
we omit values which give a negative rate in the expression
(4).4 Fig. 3 shows the transmit power distribution and Fig. 4
shows the threshold distribution. The transmit powers here
are concentrated on two values, randomizing between the
lowest (0.02 mW) and highest (1 mW) power levels. The
detection thresholds of Willie are randomized between the two
neighbouring values 1.02 and 1.03.
In the case with a jammer (Section IV), we use the following
parameters: σ2b = 0 dB, σ
2
w = 0 dB, δ = 0.1, α = 1,
N = 200, β′ = 1.5. The transmit powers range from 0.01
mW to 1 mW in steps of 0.01 mW, the jamming powers
4Using the above parameters, it turns out that we omit the transmit power
of 0.01 mW.
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Fig. 4. Detection threshold distribution
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Fig. 5. With jammer: Joint transmit and jamming power distribution
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Fig. 6. With jammer: Detection threshold distribution
range from 0 mW to 1 mW in steps of 0.01 mW, and the
detection thresholds are discretized from 0 to 3 in steps of 0.01.
When solving the linear programs (13)-(14), we again omit
values which give a negative rate in (4). Fig. 5 shows the joint
transmit and jamming power distribution and Fig. 6 shows
the threshold distribution. The transmit-jamming powers and
detection thresholds are now concentrated on multiple values.
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Fig. 7. Expected rate per channel use vs. PFA + PM
B. Trade-off between rate and detection error probabilities
Next we look at the trade-off between the expected coding
rate per channel use and PFA+PM , by finding Nash equilibria
for different values of β and β′. In the case of the transmitter
varying its transmit power, we use the following parameters:
σ2b = 0 dB, σ
2
w = 0 dB, δ = 0.1. In the case with a jammer,
we additionally set α = 1. Fig. 7 shows plots for various block
lengths N . We see that in each case, the use of a jammer
gives improvements in expected rate for the same covertness
requirement.
Interestingly, for larger values of PFA + PM , when there
is no jammer, the performance is not monotonic with N , but
seems to be worse for both small and large values of N . For
small N , this could be due to the finite blocklength correction
in the second term of (4), while the poorer performance for
large N is due to the fact that Willie can achieve better
detection when he can collect more observations, and is
consistent with the result from [1] that the number of bits
per channel use is O(
√
N/N) = O(1/
√
N) as N →∞.
On the other hand, when using a jammer, the performance
appears to improve with N , though the improvement is slight
when N is large. The performance not deteriorating for large
N is now consistent with the result of [3], that when using
a jammer the number of bits per channel use is O(N/N) =
O(1) as N →∞.
C. Comparison with uniformly distributed and constant pow-
ers
We will compare our approach with the case of uniformly
distributed transmission powers that was proposed in [8]. We
consider the case N = 2005 with the parameters σ2b = 0 dB,
σ2w = 0 dB, δ = 0.1. Fig. 8 plots the trade-off between
the expected rate per channel use and PFA + PM for 1)
our game-theoretic approach, 2) uniformly distributed pow-
ers, 3) constant powers. Also plotted is the performance
5Similar qualitative behaviour will also be observed for other values of N .
Expected rate (bits per channel use)
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
P
FA
+
P M
0.5
0.55
0.6
0.65
0.7
0.75
0.8
0.85
0.9
0.95
1
game-theoretic with jammer, N=200
game-theoretic, N=200
uniform powers, N=200
constant powers, N=200
Fig. 8. Expected rate per channel use vs. PFA + PM
of the game-theoretic approach with additional jammer. For
uniformly distributed powers, we consider powers uniformly
distributed among (0.02 mW, 0.03 mW, . . . , 0.01k mW) for
different values of k ∈ N, in each case searching for and using
the detection threshold t in (0, 0.01, . . . , 3) which minimizes
PFA+PM . For constant powers, we consider different constant
transmission powers 0.02 mW, 0.03 mW, . . . , and use in each
case the detection threshold t which minimizes PFA + PM .
We see that for very strict covertness requirements (larger
PFA+PM ) all three approaches will give similar performance,
but when the covertness requirement is less strict (smaller
PFA + PM ) our game-theoretic approach can achieve signifi-
cantly higher rates.
VI. CONCLUSION
We have studied a game-theoretic approach to the finite
blocklength covert communications problem, where Alice can
randomly vary her transmit power and Willie can randomly
vary his detection threshold. For less covert requirements,
our game theoretic approach can achieve significantly higher
coding rates than uniformly distributed transmit powers. An
alternative scheme using a jammer has also been considered,
with the formulation of a game between the jammer and
Willie. We have shown that further performance gains can be
achieved by the use of a jammer.
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